Using Contingent Valuation to Explore Willingness to Pay forRenewable Energy: A Comparison of Collective and Voluntary PaymentVehicles by Wiser, Ryan H.
Using Contingent Valuation to Explore Willingness to Pay for Renewable 
Energy:  A Comparison of Collective and Voluntary Payment Vehicles 
 
Ryan H. Wiser1
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
1 Cyclotron Rd., MS 90-4000, Berkeley, California 94720 
 
Abstract 
 
This study uses a split-sample, dichotomous choice contingent valuation survey of 1,574 
U.S. residents to explore willingness to pay (WTP) for renewable energy under collective and 
voluntary payment vehicles, and under government and private provision of the good. We also 
evaluate the impact of “participation expectations” on stated WTP. We find some evidence that, 
when confronted with a collective payment mechanism, respondents state a somewhat higher WTP 
than when voluntary payment mechanisms are used. Similarly, private provision of the good elicits 
a somewhat higher WTP than does government provision. We also find that contingent valuation 
responses are strongly correlated with expectations for the WTP of others. Our results shed light on 
strategic response behavior and the incentive compatibility of different CV designs, and offer 
practical insight into U.S. household preferences for how to support renewable energy.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Some of the most basic questions about the organization and functioning of society involve 
issues raised by the existence of public goods. With respect to environmental public goods, how 
should funds used to support environmental improvement be collected and used? In particular, are 
collective, mandatory payments superior to voluntary, charitable payments due to the possibility of 
free riding? And to what degree should the government be involved in spending these funds: should 
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the government directly fund environmental improvement projects or should the private sector be 
used to collect funds and determine funding priorities? 
This article explores these questions from the perspective of renewable energy: wind, 
geothermal, biomass, and solar. Renewable energy can be supported through a mandatory “tax” on 
electric bills or through voluntary payments via green power marketing; the government may or 
may not be heavily involved in the collection and expenditure of such funds.  
More specifically, this study analyzes the payment preferences of U.S. households through 
the implementation of a large-scale contingent valuation (CV) survey of willingness to pay (WTP) 
for renewable energy. The sensitivity of stated WTP for renewable energy under four specific 
payment and provision contexts (using three different payment levels, or bid points) is evaluated: 
1. A mandatory increase in the electricity bills of all customers, the funds from which are 
collected and spent by the government on renewable energy projects. 
2. A voluntary increase in the electricity bills of those customers who choose to pay, the funds 
from which are collected and spent by the government on renewable energy projects.  
3. A voluntary increase in the electricity bills of those customers who choose to pay, the funds 
from which are collected and spent by electricity suppliers on renewable energy projects. 
4. A mandatory increase in the electricity bills of all customers, the funds from which are 
collected and spent by electricity suppliers on renewable energy projects. 
These payment and provision scenarios are consistent with contemporary forms of support 
for renewable energy.  The first scenario – mandatory payments and government provision – is 
consistent with a system-benefits charge policy under which a small surcharge on electricity rates is 
levied, with funds so collected used to support renewable energy under what is often government 
administration; this is a policy that has been adopted in 15 U.S. states and in several countries. The 
third scenario – voluntary payments to an electricity supplier – is consistent with competitive green 
power marketing under which customers are given an opportunity to voluntary support renewable 
energy through payments on their electric bills. The fourth scenario – mandatory payments through 
electricity suppliers – is consistent with a renewables portfolio standard, a policy adopted in at least 
six countries and twenty-one U.S. states as of mid-2005 in which electricity suppliers are obligated 
to purchase a certain amount of renewable energy. The second scenario – voluntary payments and 
government provision – has few practical correlates.  
In addition to having contemporary policy relevance (and therefore providing practical 
insight on the preferences of the U.S. populace towards various approaches to encouraging 
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renewable energy supply), these four contingent valuation scenarios allow one to distinguish 
differences in stated WTP based on: (1) the payment method – is WTP affected by whether 
payments are to be made collectively or voluntarily? and (2) the provision arrangement – does the 
manner in which a good is provided, in this case through the government or the private sector, affect 
stated WTP? As described in more detail in the next section, results presented here therefore have 
implications for the methodology and practice of contingent valuation. In particular, the results shed 
light on strategic response behavior and the incentive compatibility of different CV designs. 
Three secondary objectives also influenced research design.  First, this study tentatively 
evaluates the importance of “participation expectations” in CV surveys: specifically, are individuals 
who state a WTP for renewable energy more likely to think that others will also contribute? Such 
relationships are commonly discussed in the sociology, social psychology, marketing, and collective 
action literatures, but have yet to be tested thoroughly in a contingent valuation context. Second, 
this report assesses the effects of socioeconomic, demographic, and attitudinal variables on 
willingness to pay for renewable energy. This analysis helps test the construct validity of the 
contingent valuation method, and informs our understanding of who is and is not willing to pay for 
renewable energy under different payment and provision contexts. Finally, through the 
implementation of a concurrent opinion survey with 202 respondents, this study compares the 
results of the CV surveys to a more direct approach of eliciting individuals’ payment preferences.  
 
2. Previous Research  
 
CV has become one of the most popular methods used by environmental and resource 
economists to value environmental goods (Mitchell and Carson 1989, Bjornstad and Kahn 1996, 
Bateman and Willis 1999).  Despite growing acceptance by some of the usefulness and 
meaningfulness of CV responses, the technique remains controversial (e.g., Hausman 1993, 
Cummings and Harrison 1994). That the approach taken to collecting and spending funds for 
environmental projects may influence the willingness of individuals to provide those funds will 
come as little surprise to CV practitioners. Nonetheless, to help fill important gaps in the CV 
literature, Bjornstad and Kahn (1996) identify several research areas that require attention, 
including the role of CV context in the formation of preferences, and the impact of payment 
methods on elicited WTP. These are the primary topics of this article, and below we survey relevant 
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literature on provision and payment effects in CV research, and the more general literature on the 
influence of “participation expectations” on survey response. 
 
2.1 Provision and Payment Variations 
In the present study we consider two ways in which the good – renewable energy – could be 
provided. One approach is for the government to collect and distribute funds for renewable energy; 
the other is for a private electricity supplier to collect and spend the funds.  A priori, economic 
theory can do little to predict how or if WTP will differ based on this variation in the CV scenario. 
One might expect, however, that any difference in WTP across the two provision arrangements will 
be driven by the relative trust respondents place in the government and the private sector in 
effectively delivering renewable energy programs. 
We also evaluate two possible payment methods. The first is a collective payment approach 
in which all households and businesses are required to pay for the provision of the good; in the case 
of renewable energy, this takes the form of a required surcharge on electricity bills. The second 
payment method is a voluntary one in which each household has the option, but not the obligation, 
to support the provision of the good; in the case of renewable energy, this is envisioned as a 
voluntary supplemental charge on electricity bills.   
There have been relatively few efforts within the CV literature to systematically test the 
sensitivity of WTP to whether payments are to be made collectively or voluntarily.  A review of the 
CV, collective action, experimental economics and related literatures leads to two conflicting 
theories of behavioral response when individuals are faced with these payment options.   
Free Riding and Truth Telling: One behavioral theory relies on the traditional economic 
concept of “free riding.”  As is well known, when payment is voluntary, economic theory predicts 
that few individuals will be willing to pay to help provide public goods. The free riding concept has 
been used to explain the large discrepancy between the stated environmental attitudes of the general 
populace and the weak actions of that same group in voluntarily engaging in environmental 
behaviors (Foster et al. 1997).  The theory has also been tested in experimental economic research – 
while complete free riding is not generally found, the evidence for a significant degree of such 
behavior is clear (Ledyard 1995). Within the CV literature, free-riding has been used to explain why 
actual contributions to public causes are often well below what CV studies would seem to predict 
(Hanemann 1996, Carson 1997, Taylor 1998), including empirical differences between hypothetical 
and actual voluntary contributions to renewable energy (Champ and Bishop 2001). In the present 
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setting, if survey respondents are assumed to answer CV questions “truthfully” (i.e., as if they are 
being faced with a true economic choice to voluntarily contribute), free riding might also be used to 
predict that stated WTP under voluntary payment will be lower than elicited WTP when payments 
are to be made collectively (Champ et al. 2002).  
Strategic Behavior and Incentive Compatibility: While few would doubt the incentive to 
free ride when real economic commitments are involved, CV studies rely on hypothetical survey 
questions, not real commitments. The hypothetical nature of CV research leads to another possible 
behavioral response: strategic behavior and overbidding. Concerns over strategic bias in public 
goods valuation are often attributed to Samuelson (1954), with perhaps the first test of these effects 
in a CV context by Bohm (1972). Even now, however, the concept of strategic behavior and the 
related concept of “incentive compatibility” have only begun to be fully integrated into CV design.  
Incentive compatibility refers to whether respondents to a CV survey have an incentive to 
reveal their true valuation for the good. Perhaps the most significant recent contribution to the 
incentive compatibility literature as it relates to CV studies and different payment methods comes 
from Carson (1997) and Carson et al. (1999). These studies conclude that for a survey to elicit true 
preferences, it needs to be consequential; that is, the survey results must be viewed by the 
respondent as possibly influencing actual outcomes that the respondent cares about. Following 
Hoehn and Randall (1987) and Randall (1996), these authors also make a persuasive case that for a 
survey to elicit true preferences, a single, binary dichotomous choice survey question (i.e., a yes/no 
valuation question) with a collective payment rule must be used. The incentive compatibility of this 
approach is one of the primary reasons for the NOAA panel recommendation to use dichotomous 
choice elicitation methods (Arrow et al. 1993).  
In the case of voluntary contributions to the provision of public goods, however, Carson 
(1997) and Carson et al. (1999) identify an important possible cause of strategic behavior.  These 
authors argue that respondents may overstate their WTP when presented with a hypothetical, 
voluntary payment mechanism. As long as the good is potentially desirable, it is always optimal to 
say “yes” to a survey valuation question that poses a voluntary payment. This is because the only 
influence of a “yes” response to a hypothetical CV question is to encourage the actual fund-raising 
effort, and many respondents may want the good to be provided by others or may want the option of 
actually volunteering to pay for the good at a later time. Consequently, in a hypothetical survey 
context, a conniving respondent may overstate their WTP in a voluntary payment setting.  
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Related CV Research: These two theories of behavioral response suggest opposite effects. 
Many early CV studies used voluntary payment methods to elicit WTP. Recognizing that such an 
approach fails the test of incentive compatibility, however, most contemporary CV research uses 
collective payment vehicles. Surprisingly, however, only a limited amount of empirical work has 
been undertaken to explore the differences between voluntary and collective WTP, and much of the 
work that does exist suffers from serious methodological shortcomings.   
A number of studies have found no difference in collective and voluntary WTP. Milon 
(1989), using an approach somewhat similar to the one used in this article, evaluates collective and 
voluntary WTP for an artificial reef using a dichotomous choice elicitation format. No significant 
differences in WTP are found. Ajzen et al. (1996) also evaluate WTP for a public (movie theater) 
and private (noise filter) good under voluntary and compulsory payment vehicles. Using a within-
sample approach and open-ended response format, they also find that the payment method has little 
impact. An earlier study by Babb and Sherr (1975) similarly found little evidence of strategic 
behavior when respondents are faced with a voluntary payment mechanism.  
Other studies do find some evidence for different response effects when individuals are 
confronted with collective and voluntary payment vehicles. Some of these studies attribute these 
differences to possible incentive effects, while others emphasize possible credibility differences 
among the payment vehicles.  Champ et al. (2002) use an approach that is nearly identical to our 
own, and find that a voluntary payment mechanism for preserving open space results in a somewhat 
lower stated WTP than a mandatory tax. Green et al. (1994), using an open-ended elicitation format, 
find limited evidence for higher WTP estimates under a taxation arrangement than under voluntary 
contributions. In a pilot study with an open-ended elicitation format, Bateman et al. (1995) found 
that a voluntary payment vehicle suffered disproportionately from zero WTP bids compared to a 
taxation vehicle, and also generated lower mean WTP estimates. Jakobsson and Dragun (1996) find 
that, under both discrete and continuous response formats, mean WTP for possum protection under 
a donation mechanisms was 35% lower than under a tax mechanism. Stevens et al. (1991), 
meanwhile, find that, when confronted with a voluntary payment method for protecting wildlife, 
40% of respondents who indicated they were not willing to pay stated that wildlife should be 
preserved through taxes or license fees.  Similarly, Harris and Brown (1992) present survey 
respondents with a choice of four payment methods for a reduction in wildlife impacts; the majority 
of respondents preferred collective payment methods.   
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2.2 Participation Expectations 
By evaluating the relationship between stated WTP and the participation expectations of 
others (i.e., are individuals who state a WTP for renewable energy more likely to think that others 
will also contribute), this study also seeks to contribute, albeit more modestly, to the collective 
action and related literatures on what is variously called interpersonal influence, reciprocity, trust in 
others, and bandwagon effects. While a variety of academic literatures have noted the prevalence of 
the “participation expectations” effect and of interpersonal influence in decision-making more 
broadly, these effects have not been thoroughly tested in CV research.2  
Even within CV, however, a debate has arisen over whether survey participants should be 
informed of the valuation responses of others. Economists often argue that providing survey 
respondents information on the (claimed or actual) responses on other subjects could induce 
strategic behavior or reliance on the “informed” bids of others in formulating one’s own answers, 
thereby invalidating the valuation questions (Arrow 1986, Freeman 1986). Kahnemann (1986), 
meanwhile, sees such information as an integral part of the valuation process – any one individual’s 
WTP is inextricably linked to what others are paying.   
Two of the more relevant papers in other disciplines include Orbell and Dawes (1991) and 
Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee (1977), both of which conclude that, in experimental settings, 
contributors to public goods expect significantly more cooperation than do defectors.  A related 
study by Pieters et al. (1998) shows that the expected pro-environmental behavior of other 
households is positively correlated with individuals’ own environmental behaviors. 
Others have gone even farther by claiming a causal relationship: people are not only 
sensitive to what others are doing, but may not participate in an activity unless they are confident 
that others are participating as well.  For example, in sociology the prevalence of “bandwagon” or 
“critical mass” effects is often noted in studies of how innovations diffuse through society and in 
studies of how collective action problems can be solved when interpersonal networks and social 
norms become activated (Rogers 1962, Marwell et al. 1988, Macy 1991, Elster 1989, Oliver 1993). 
In evaluations of environmental attitudes and behaviors, studies often find that individuals who rank 
higher in “trust” or “faith in others” also contribute more to environmental causes, and that social 
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2 Some exceptions do exist. Fischhoff and Furby (1988), Harris et al. (1989), and Blamey (1998), for example, note the 
importance of social context and the possible influence of others in CV transactions in a qualitative fashion, while 
Vadnjal and O’Conner (1994), Schkade and Payne (1994), and Shechter et al. (1998) note this influence after 
interviewing or surveying CV respondents. Others have explicitly explored the impact of “reminders” of others’ 
contributions on WTP (e.g., Green et al. 1994 and Bohara et al. 1998).   
influences affect behavior (Manzo and Weinstein 1987, Bearden et al. 1989, LaTour and Manrai 
1989, Lutzenhiser 1993, Osterhus 1997). Marketers, meanwhile, describe the difficultly of 
“crossing the chasm” to reach critical mass in product sales (Moore 1991), while economists and 
political scientists sometimes find evidence for bandwagon effects in voting behavior (Hong and 
Konrad 1998). Finally, in the collective action literature, Sugden (1984), Chong (1991), Lichbach 
(1996) and others highlight the importance of reciprocity in providing incentives to contribute; 
contributions are often matched with contributions, while defection is matched with defection. 
Formally, game theorists and others note that if individuals can contribute to public goods 
contingent upon other participants, they can sometimes “solve” the free rider dilemma (Axelrod 
1984, Cornes and Sandler 1986, Mitchell and Carson 1989). 
 
3. Methods and Data 
 
This study explores WTP for renewable energy under collective and voluntary payment 
mechanisms and under private and government provision, as well as the impacts of participation 
expectations on WTP.  Several studies have been conducted over the last several years that have 
used opinion surveys or deliberative polling to explore individual preferences for supporting 
renewable power generation. These studies find evidence that U.S. residents prefer collective, 
mandatory payments for renewable energy to voluntary ones (Decision Research 1992, ECAP 1998, 
Sloan and Taddune 1999, Ferguson 1999, Farhar and Coburn 1999, Farhar 1999, Guild et al. 2003). 
None of these opinion surveys, however, have relied on the CV method.  
Our study builds off of these results by using CV, but also makes advances relative to much 
of the previous CV research by: (1) undertaking a complete CV study rather than a pilot study, (2) 
carefully designing the valuation questions to distinguish between voluntary and collective 
willingness to pay, (3) implementing the survey through standard CV procedures, including 
dichotomous choice elicitation and a split sample design, (4) including other questions in the CV 
survey to better understand responses received, and (5) undertaking an opinion survey with which to 
compare CV response.  
  Our analysis is based on data from a single-bounded, dichotomous choice CV survey of 
1,574 U.S. households, and on data from a more limited opinion survey with 202 respondents. The 
CV study crossed payment method (collective or voluntary) and provision arrangement 
(government or private), yielding a four-cell experimental design (see Table 1). A split-sample 
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design was employed: each survey respondent received a different CV question corresponding to 
one of the four CV payment and provision scenarios. Within each of these four independent 
samples, three different bid points were used (50¢, $3 and $8/month, for a duration of three years), 
with each survey respondent receiving just one of these three payment levels. A final sample 
received an opinion survey intended to cover many of the same topics as the CV survey, but to more 
directly query respondents on their payment preferences. The three-year payment window was 
established to make clear that this was not to be an indefinite funding obligation.  
We note that this is not a standard contingent valuation study in which a single 
environmental good is being valued. In particular, in this survey higher bid levels correspond to 
more renewable energy being supplied and increased environmental improvements. As a result, 
“valuation” of the good is not possible in the traditional sense. The approach taken here is, however, 
consistent with that used in several other CV studies (see, e.g., Champ et al. 1997, Berrens et al. 
1998), and is also more consistent with the actual renewable energy policy choices facing 
consumers and policymakers. To make the survey consequential, the survey text noted: “The federal 
government is considering whether and how to support renewable energy in the future. The 
University of California is conducting this independent survey to help the country make these 
important choices.”  
The survey was conducted as a mail questionnaire.  The population of interest for this 
research consisted of U.S. residents who pay their own electric bills.  The sample was purchased 
from Survey Sampling Inc., and residents were selected and sampled randomly in proportion to 
their occurrence in the 50 states. A total of 4,056 CV surveys and 544 opinion surveys were mailed; 
1574 completed CV surveys and 202 completed opinion surveys were returned. After considering 
undeliverable surveys and ineligible participants, the aggregate response rate to the CV surveys 
(and the opinion survey) was over 45%, and there were no statistically significant variations in 
response rate by CV scenario or by bid amount (chi(2) test, p = 0.985). There also appear to be no 
systematic differences in the respondents by survey type or version.   
Both the CV and opinion surveys were formatted and administered in a fashion largely 
consistent with that recommended by Dillman (2000) in order to maximize response rates at 
reasonable cost. Survey administration included an advance letter, a mailing of the survey packet, a 
thank you/reminder postcard, a follow-up mail packet, and a follow-up telephone call. The CV 
surveys were 12 pages in length, and included “warm-up” questions, the valuation exercise, 
attitudinal questions, and demographic and socioeconomic questions. The opinion survey, at 16 
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pages in length, was structured similarly but replaced the valuation exercise with more general 
questions on renewable energy payment preferences. An informal focus group and a mailed pre-test 
of the survey instrument preceded survey implementation.  
To make clean comparisons across CV scenarios, we sought to design each scenario in a 
comparable fashion, varying only the payment method (collective or voluntary) and provision 
arrangement (government or private sector). Unfortunately, especially under the private sector 
provision scenarios, such comparability is not perfect. To make the scenarios credible and give 
them added policy relevance, Scenario 3 involves the respondent switching to a new electricity 
provider to pay the specified premium, while Scenario 4 imposes a renewable energy requirement 
on electricity suppliers, the cost of which would flow through to all customers. Neither Scenario 1 
nor Scenario 2 includes switching electricity suppliers or the imposition of a renewable energy 
requirement. While this makes it more difficult to derive definitive conclusions on the impact of 
payment and provision arrangements, it also makes the scenarios consistent with current renewable 
energy support programs, offering a degree of practical relevancy that would not otherwise have 
been possible. Also note that we treated renewable energy as a homogenous good, and did not 
identify the specific amounts of different types of renewable energy that would be supported by 
customer payments; this approach is also consistent with present policy efforts in the U.S. Copies of 
the full surveys can be found in Wiser (2003); the specific valuation questions for the four scenarios 
are provided in Appendix A. 
 
4. Payment and Provision Preferences: Basic CV Results  
 
The most direct way to test for payment and provision effects in the data is to compare the 
empirical distribution of WTP responses across the four CV scenarios. Figure 1 shows the important 
pair wise comparisons among the scenarios, illustrating the separable effects of payment method 
(voluntary vs. collective) and provision arrangement (government vs. private).    
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Some systematic differences among response to the CV scenarios appear to exist depending 
on the payment method and provision arrangement. The top two graphs embedded in Figure 1 show 
pair wise comparisons where the provision approach is fixed and the payment method varies. Under 
both provision modes (government and private), the collective payment method elicits a higher 
WTP at all bid points than does voluntary payment.  Similarly, the bottom two graphs in the figure 
show pair wise comparisons where the payment method is fixed and the provision arrangement 
varies. Under both payment methods (collective and voluntary), the private provision arrangement 
elicits a higher WTP at all bid points than does government provision. These results suggest that 
collective payment methods elicit a higher WTP than voluntary ones, and that private provision 
arrangements elicit a higher WTP than governmental ones.  
Nonetheless, these differences are not always sizable. The statistical test used here is a 
likelihood ratio test for the equality of two binomial variables. We apply this test to each of the four 
pair wise comparisons shown in Figure 1, as opposed to each data point, allowing one to evaluate 
whether the different treatments (payment method and provision arrangement) yield statistically 
distinct responses on “average” across all bid points.3 Results are presented in Figure 1 under each 
of the four pair wise comparison graphs. “LR” represents the test statistic of the likelihood ratio test. 
When compared to critical values on the chi-squared distribution, “p” represents the statistical 
significance of the results.  
Based on this test, statistically significant differences can be claimed for just two of the four 
pair wise comparisons: 
• Under the private provision cases, collective payments elicit a higher WTP than voluntary 
payments at a significance level of p = 0.009 (significance of over 99%).  
• Under the collective payment cases, private provision elicits a higher WTP than government 
provision at a significance level of p = 0.015 (significance of 98.5%).  
The other two pair wise comparisons show data that are supportive of these conclusions – 
collective payment and private provision elicit a slightly higher WTP than voluntary payment and 
government provision – but statistical significance cannot be claimed (p= 0.78 and 0.41).  
                                                 
3 For a single bid point, consider two different samples: A and B. To test whether the binomial parameter θ  in samples 
A and B is the same (θA = θB = θ  ) or different (θA ≠ θB ) a simple likelihood ratio test may be used.  Pooling the 
two samples, the restricted log-likelihood function will equal: 
yi lnθ + (1− yi)ln(1−θ)(
i=1
n∑ )
)
         (1) 
The unrestricted log-likelihood function will be:  
yi lnθA + (1− yi)ln(1− θA )( )
i=1
nA∑ + yi lnθB + (1− yi)ln(1− θB)(
i=1
nB∑     (2) 
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This is simply the sum of the log-likelihood functions for each sub-sample.  The test is then a simple likelihood ratio 
test, and can be compared to a chi-squared random variable with 1 degree of freedom. Because our respondents are 
randomly assigned each to a single bid point, this approach easily generalizes to multiple bid points.  We assume that 
each bid point has its own binomial parameterθBid . The log-likelihood for multiple bid points is therefore the sum of 
the log-likelihoods for each bid point.  With three bid points this can be compared to a chi-square random variable with 
3 degrees of freedom. 
 5. Participation Expectation Effects: Basic CV Results 
 
The CV survey also explored the expectations of the survey respondents about the 
willingness to pay of other U.S. residents. That is, do respondents who state a WTP for renewable 
energy themselves predict that more people will join them in being willing to pay than do those 
respondents who say they are unwilling to pay the premium?  
In the present study, we test for these effects in a hypothetical contingent valuation setting.  
Specifically, each CV survey asked what percent of U.S. residents the respondent believes would 
support and be willing to pay the specified premium for renewable energy. Not only do answers to 
this question allow one to evaluate the relationship between stated willingness to pay and 
expectations for the willingness to pay of others, but they also allow one to assess how survey 
respondents believe others would respond to different payment or provision contexts.  
Table 2 shows the mean results for this question by bid, scenario, and response to the 
valuation question. Several important tentative conclusions emerge from these data: 
• Payment Method Affects WTP Expectations. As with the direct valuation question 
reported earlier, a greater willingness to pay is expected under collective payment methods 
than under voluntary payment. This is true under both the government and private provision 
arrangements. The differences also appear more substantial across all bid levels than the 
differences reported earlier for the direct valuation question. On average, collective WTP is 
expected to be approximately 25% higher than voluntary WTP. Survey respondents 
seemingly understand the nature of the free-riding effect: respondents expect more residents 
to support a collective payment approach for renewable energy than a voluntary one.   
• Individuals Who Are Willing to Pay Often Expect Others to Reciprocate. The WTP 
expectations for others is far lower among those who are not willing to pay for renewable 
energy themselves than it is for those who are willing to pay. The differences are striking. 
Those who indicate a willingness to pay for renewable energy often expect twice as many 
people to do likewise than do those who indicate they are not willing to pay. Apparently, 
regardless of the payment and provision method, those who indicate a willingness to pay for 
renewable energy also believe that many others will reciprocate and be willing to pay. This 
finding is consistent with those of previous academic work, as described earlier.  
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• Respondents Perceive Themselves to be More Willing to Pay than Others.  How do 
these responses compare to actual stated WTP as expressed in the earlier valuation 
question? Using overall responses from Table 2 and comparing them to Figure 1, it is clear 
that respondents’ perception of the WTP of others is lower than their own stated willingness 
to pay.  Apparently, respondents to this survey in general feel that they are more likely to be 
willing to pay for renewable energy than are others. This is consistent with other research 
findings that show that individuals attribute higher levels of pro-environmental behavior to 
themselves than to others (Pieters et al. 1998).  
 
6. Multivariate Regression Results 
 
Here we present logit analysis, performed in a fashion that is typical in contingent valuation 
studies (see, e.g., Hanemann and Kanninen 1999).  Perhaps the simplest method of testing for the 
impact of payment method and provision arrangement on responses to the valuation question is to 
consider pair wise comparisons between the different valuation scenarios, much as was done earlier 
with summary statistics.  Using this approach, the dependent variable in the logit equation is 
whether or not the respondent said “yes” to the valuation question (1=yes; 0=no). Including a 
dummy “treatment” variable that indicates whether payment was voluntary or collective, or whether 
provision was through the government or the private sector, allows one to test whether the treatment 
has a significant positive or negative effect on the probability of being willing to pay for renewable 
energy. Other socioeconomic and demographic variables are also included as independent 
explanatory variables. Table 3 shows the independent variables used in the simple logit analysis that 
follows and the more comprehensive model presented later. 
Table 4 shows the results of the four pair wise regression analyses. Each of the four pair 
wise regression equations equates to one of the graphs shown earlier in Figure 1: the first column in 
the table analyzes responses to Scenarios 1 & 2, the second column Scenarios 3 & 4, the third 
column Scenarios 2 & 3, and the fourth column Scenarios 1 & 4.  
The regression results are consistent with the findings presented earlier. The negative 
coefficient on “voluntary payment” in the first two columns in Table 4 shows that collective 
payments elicit a higher WTP than voluntary ones under both the private (column 2) and 
government (column 1) provision scenarios, though only the coefficient in the private provision 
case is statistically significant. Similarly, the positive coefficient on the “private provision” variable 
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in the latter two columns in Table 4 shows that private provision elicits a higher WTP than 
government provision, though only the coefficient in the collective provision case is highly 
significant.  
As for the demographic and socioeconomic variables, some consistent impacts are found. 
Households with higher incomes and respondents who are more liberal are found be to be more 
likely to say “yes” to the valuation question.  Being female also appears to increase the probability 
of being willing to pay for renewable energy, but this effect is only apparent and statistically 
significant in two of the four regressions. Respondents with children appear less willing to pay for 
renewable energy, though again this effect is only significant in two of the four pair wise 
comparisons. Finally, though statistical significance is limited, increased age appears to reduce 
WTP and education appears to increase WTP; home ownership has no consistent effect. 
 
7. A More Complex Regression Model 
  
A more complex regression model, incorporating both the attitudinal and “participation 
expectation” variables listed in Table 3, is described in this section. Rather than proceeding with 
pair wise comparisons, here four distinct logit models are estimated, one for each of the four 
payment and provision scenarios. The goal is to evaluate the impacts of various socioeconomic, 
demographic, and attitudinal factors – including “participation expectation” – on the probability of a 
“yes” response to the valuation question, and to do this across different CV scenarios.  Table 5 
shows the results of the logit analysis in the same format as provided earlier. Visual inspection of 
the results leads to the following conclusions: 
• Model Accuracy Improves: Including attitudinal variables in addition to standard 
socioeconomic and demographic variables increases the predictive capabilities of the 
regression models substantially.4 At the same time, once attitudinal variables are included in 
the model, the statistical significance of the socioeconomic and demographic variables 
decreases. The importance of attitudinal variables in this analysis is consistent with the 
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4 Data presented earlier for the more restricted model runs that only included socioeconomic and demographic variables 
showed that those logit models accurately predicted respondents’ “yes/no” valuation responses 59-67% of the time.  The 
more complex models presented here predict valuation responses accurately 77-85% of the time. This comparison is not 
perfect, however, because the more restricted model was run using pair wise comparisons, while the more complete 
model was run on each valuation scenario separately. We therefore also ran the logit model on each valuation scenario 
separately, with attitudinal variables excluded. The results show a prediction accuracy for these four runs that ranges 
from 59.8% to 70.7%.  
results of other CV studies, which have also found that attitudinal variables often do a better 
job of predicting WTP response than do socioeconomic and demographic factors (Luzar and 
Cosse 1998, Kotchen and Reiling 2000).  
• “Participation Expectations” Effects are Substantial. Data reported here confirm 
previous analysis that showed the importance of “participation expectations.”  Respondents 
who indicate they are willing to pay for renewable energy are far more likely to believe that 
large numbers of others will also contribute. This is true across all payment and provision 
scenarios, and can be seen by the statistical significance of the “participation expectation” 
variable in all four of the regressions presented in Table 5.   
• Several Attitudinal Variables Have Significant Effects. Those who believe that their 
family and friends would also support renewable energy (“family support”) are more likely 
to be willing to pay themselves. This result is supportive of the “participation expectations” 
finding discussed earlier, and suggests that the influence of near peers is separate from the 
more general “participation expectations” result. Similarly, those who more strongly agreed 
with the statement “I am more likely to buy environmentally friendly products if I know that 
other people are doing the same” (“affected by others”) were also more likely to be willing 
to pay for renewable energy. A belief that government should require everyone to pay for 
environmental improvements (“all should pay”) is positively related to willingness to pay 
for renewable energy, including those with collective and voluntary payments. Apparently, 
those who are willing to pay for renewable energy, regardless of the payment method, are 
also inclined to believe that everyone should be required to pay for environmental 
improvements.  On the other hand, distrust of the government to effectively collect and 
spend funds (“government distrust”) is negatively related to WTP in all four CV scenarios. 
Survey participants who strongly agreed with the statement “I will only pay more for 
environmentally friendly products if I receive a direct benefit from doing so” (“direct 
benefits”) were less willing to pay for renewables than those who disagreed with this 
statement.  Finally, those respondents who indicated that their household undertakes a large 
number of environmental actions on a regular basis (e.g., recycling, purchasing organic 
foods, etc.) also appear more willing to pay for renewable energy, especially in the 
collective payment scenarios. 
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8. Opinion Survey Results 
 
As an adjunct to the CV surveys, an opinion survey was fielded to a more limited sample of 
U.S. residents. An important goal of this survey was to provide a measuring stick for the CV results. 
As shown in more detail in Wiser (2003), results of the opinion survey are found to be consistent 
with the CV results presented above.  
In particular, the opinion survey directly asked whether survey respondents would prefer 
that collective or voluntary payment methods be used to support renewable energy.  
 
If renewable energy is to be supported, the extra money needed to increase the supply of 
renewable energy could be collected in a number of ways. Of the two possible approached listed 
below, which one would you most prefer? 
1. Option 1: The extra money could be raised through a required surcharge on the electricity 
bills of all homes and businesses in the United States. 
2. Option 2: The extra money could be raised through a voluntary surcharge on the electricity 
bills of only those homes and businesses in the United States that volunteer to support 
renewable energy. 
 
A very narrow majority of U.S. households (53% to 47%) indicate a preference for 
collective payment vehicles (Table 6). As expected, those U.S. residents who show a strong affinity 
for renewable energy generally prefer collective payment methods, while those U.S. residents who 
do not believe renewable energy is a priority prefer voluntary payment. 
Similarly, consistent with the CV results, a small majority of opinion survey respondents 
prefer private provision mechanisms to government provision (Table 7), when responding to the 
question below.   
 
Funds used to support renewable energy could be managed in many ways. Of the two possible 
approaches listed below, which one would you most prefer? 
1. Option 1: Funds from an electricity bill surcharge could be collected by the government and 
used to help fund the construction of more renewable energy projects 
2. Option 2: Funds from an electricity bill surcharge could be collected by each customers’ 
electricity supplier and used by private companies that sell renewable energy to build more 
renewable energy projects 
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 The opinion survey also directly asked a question related to “participation expectations”:  
 
Which one of the following statements do you most agree with: 
 
1 My household would be more interested in purchasing renewable energy if we knew that lots 
of other households were also purchasing renewable energy 
2 My household would not be affected by the behavior of other households when deciding 
whether to purchase renewable energy 
3 My household would be less interested in purchasing renewable energy if we knew that lots 
of other households were also purchasing renewable energy 
 
Opinion survey results show that 46% of respondents say they would be more interested in 
purchasing renewable energy if they knew that others were doing so, while just 5% say they would 
be less interested. Another 49% say they would be unaffected by the behavior of others. This 
finding suggests that people are sensitive to what others are (or are perceived to be) doing and may 
not contribute towards renewable energy if they are not confident that others are also contributing.   
 
9. Conclusions 
 
The main objective of this research has been to test the hypothesis that individuals’ stated 
WTP for renewable energy will differ based on the way in which the good is provided and funded. 
We find that contingent valuation responses are somewhat sensitive to payment and provision 
context. Using both bivariate and multivariate analysis, we find a statistically significant difference 
in WTP responses in two of four pair wise comparisons. We find some evidence that elicited WTP 
for renewable energy is higher under a collective payment method than under a voluntary one. 
Similarly, we find some evidence that stated WTP under a private provision arrangement exceeds 
WTP under government provision.  These CV findings are also consistent with a 
contemporaneously fielded opinion survey. 
Earlier, we presented information on two plausible behavioral responses to voluntary 
payment vehicles in CV: free-riding or strategic response/overbidding. Consistent with Champ et al. 
(2002), results from this study suggest that the first effect may exert a slightly more powerful 
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influence on survey responses than the second, at least in the setting presented in this article. 
Despite theoretical concerns raised by Randall (1996), Carson et al. (1999), and others, this study 
finds limited evidence for the magnitude of overbidding behavior that is posited by those who are 
concerned that strategic behavior may be rampant in CV surveys that lack incentive compatibility. 
The results presented in this article show that valuation responses to CV surveys based on voluntary 
payments will not necessarily be overstated relative to the incentive-compatible collective payment 
approach (though, it deserves note, that they may be overstated relative to actual payments – see 
Champ and Bishop 2001). Differences between collective and voluntary stated WTP are found to be 
modest and, if anything, it appears as if some CV respondents may recognize the incentive to free 
ride and respond to non-incentive compatible CV surveys as if they involved real economic 
commitments. As a result, this study suggests that selection of an incentive-compatible collective 
payment approach or a non-incentive compatible voluntary approach may not be a decisive factor in 
CV surveys.  As such, CV surveys that rely on a voluntary payment vehicle should be used with 
caution, but should not simply be dismissed out of hand due to theoretical concerns. 
Interestingly, we also find that contingent valuation responses are strongly correlated with 
expectations for the willingness to pay of others. Those survey respondents who indicate a 
willingness to pay for renewable energy are systematically more likely to also believe that many 
other U.S. residents would also pay the specified premium for renewable energy. By illustrating the 
apparent importance of such social influences in a contingent valuation setting, this study extends a 
large body of other work that has explored these concepts in more detail. Nonetheless, while this 
correlation is strong, it does not yet prove causality: is it because others are expected to contribute 
that survey respondents also indicate a willingness to pay, or do respondents who say they are 
willing to pay simply “defend” their choice by saying that they believe others would make a similar 
one? The results presented here are not sufficient to truly understand the nature and magnitude of 
these influences.  At a minimum, however, these results suggest that there is a need to include social 
factors in understanding choice behavior when public goods are involved, and to understand 
responses to contingent valuation surveys. The results also suggest that individuals may come into a 
valuation exercise already holding views on the likely contributions of others and that these views 
may affect valuation responses.  Finally, results confirm the findings of Smith and Haugtvedt 
(1995) and Weiner and Doescher (1991), both of whom argue that concerns that others may not 
contribute may partially explain the gap between stated environmental attitudes and actual 
environmental behaviors. 
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The survey results presented here also provide some practical insight into the preferences of 
U.S. residents towards different approaches to supporting renewable energy, and the barriers to 
growing the voluntary green power market. The option that elicits the highest WTP in the CV 
survey is one in which electricity suppliers are obligated to purchase a certain amount of renewable 
energy: collective payment, with private provision. This policy approach is consistent with a 
renewables portfolio standard, a policy that has gained some popularity in recent years. Related, 
when asked about the participation expectations of others, respondents consistently indicated that 
they would expect a higher WTP under collective payment than under voluntary payment. It 
deserves mention, however, that the strength of these preferences (as expressed in the CV and 
opinion surveys) is perhaps not as high as what one might expect for a good (renewable energy) that 
provides public benefits. Apparently, at least in this survey setting, U.S. residents do not recognize 
the need for collective action for renewable energy to the degree that one might expect. Additional 
research is needed to further explore this finding.   
Nor is voluntary support for renewable energy likely to be a panacea.  First, even in a survey 
setting, the incentive to free-ride and not voluntarily pay for renewable energy is apparent.  Second, 
our participation expectations results suggest the anemic 1-3% customer participation rates typical 
of voluntary green marketing efforts to date may, in part, be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Though the 
findings are still tentative, CV results show a strong positive correlation between stated WTP and 
the expectations for the WTP of others. As such, without a “critical mass” of participants, 
households may become disillusioned and choose not to participate. The findings presented here 
therefore suggest that the most difficult part of developing the voluntary green power market may 
be to develop a stable base of contributors on which further contributions can grow. 
 
Appendix A: The Four Contingent Valuation Scenarios  
 
Scenario 1: Collective Payment, Government Provision 
The federal government is considering a program where all homes and businesses in the United 
States would be required to pay a $3 surcharge on their monthly electricity bills for 3 years to increase the 
supply of renewable energy.  This surcharge will be collected by the government and used to help fund the 
construction of more renewable energy projects.  Because the proposed surcharge is mandatory, all homes 
and businesses will be required to pay.  
Data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency shows that for each household a surcharge of 
$3/month for 3 years will provide the same environmental benefits as not driving a car a total of 72,000 
 
19
miles. Because every home and business would be required to pay this surcharge, renewable energy 
production in the United States would increase from 2% to 8%. 
  Remembering that all homes and businesses in the United States will have to pay the same amount if 
this policy is adopted, would your household support the adoption of this proposed monthly surcharge of $3 
for 3 years (equal to $36 per year and $108 over the life of the program)? 
 
Scenario 2: Voluntary Payment, Government Provision 
The federal government is considering a program where all homes and businesses in the United 
States would be given the opportunity to voluntarily pay a $3 surcharge on their monthly electricity bills for 
3 years to increase the supply of renewable energy.  This surcharge will be collected by the government and 
used to help fund the construction of more renewable energy projects.  Because the proposed surcharge is 
voluntary, many homes and businesses may decide not to pay.  
Data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency shows that for each household a surcharge of 
$3/month for 3 years will provide the same environmental benefits as not driving a car a total of 72,000 
miles. If every home and business were to pay this surcharge, renewable energy production in the United 
States would increase from 2% to 8%. 
  Remembering that all homes and businesses in the United States will be able to individually decide 
whether to contribute and that many homes and businesses may decide not to pay, would your household 
volunteer to pay this proposed monthly surcharge of $3 for 3 years (equal to $36 per year and $108 over the 
life of the program)?  
 
Scenario 3: Voluntary Payment, Private Provision 
The federal government is considering a program where all homes and businesses in the United 
States would be given the opportunity to voluntarily purchase their electricity from a private company that 
sells renewable energy.  By switching to a private electricity provider and paying a $3 surcharge on their 
monthly electricity bills for 3 years, homes and businesses will help increase the supply of renewable energy.  
This surcharge will be collected by the private company and used to build more renewable energy projects.  
Because switching electricity providers and paying the proposed surcharge is voluntary, many homes and 
businesses may decide not to switch providers and not to pay.  
Data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency shows that for each household a surcharge of 
$3/month for 3 years will provide the same environmental benefits as not driving a car a total of 72,000 
miles. If every home and business were to pay this surcharge, renewable energy production in the United 
States would increase from 2% to 8%. 
  Remembering that all homes and businesses in the United States will be able to individually decide 
whether to contribute and that many homes and businesses may decide not to pay, would your household 
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volunteer to switch to a private electricity provider and pay this proposed monthly surcharge of $3 for 3 
years (equal to $36 per year and $108 over the life of the program)? 
 
Scenario 4: Collective Payment, Private Provision 
The federal government is considering a program where all electricity suppliers (e.g., utilities) in the 
United States would be required to purchase some of their electricity from private companies that sell 
renewable energy. To meet this requirement, and to increase the supply of renewable energy, all homes and 
businesses in the United States would be required to pay a $3 surcharge on their monthly electricity bills for 
3 years.  This surcharge will be collected by each customers' electricity supplier and used by private 
companies that sell renewable energy to build more renewable energy projects.  Because the proposed 
surcharge is mandatory, all homes and businesses will be required to pay.  
Data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency shows that for each household a surcharge of 
$3/month for 3 years will provide the same environmental benefits as not driving a car a total of 72,000 
miles. Because every home and business would be required to pay this surcharge, renewable energy 
production in the United States would increase from 2% to 8%. 
Remembering that all homes and businesses in the United States will have to pay the same amount if 
this policy is adopted, would your household support the adoption of this proposed monthly surcharge of $3 
for 3 years (equal to $36 per year and $108 over the life of the program)? 
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Table 1. Four Contingent Valuation Scenarios  
 
 Voluntary or Collective Payment 
 
 
SCENARIO 2 
Voluntary Payment, 
Government Provision 
 
 
 
SCENARIO 1 
Collective Payment, 
Government Provision 
(consistent with a system 
benefits charge) 
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SCENARIO 3 
Voluntary Payment,  
Private Provision 
(consistent with competitive 
green power marketing) 
 
 
 
SCENARIO 4 
Collective Payment,  
Private Provision 
(consistent with a renewables 
portfolio standard) 
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Table 2. Expectations of the WTP of Others by Scenario and Bid 
Bid AmountCV Scenario Response to Valuation 
Question 50¢ /month $3/month $8/month 
Yes 62.1% 50.6% 49.5% 
No 37.9% 23.5% 30.7% 
Scenario 1:  
Collective Payment, 
Government Provision Overall 52.9% 37.4% 38.7% 
Yes 49.3% 42.9% 36.3% 
No 31.7% 23.2% 23.4% 
Scenario 2:  
Voluntary Payment, 
Government Provision Overall 41.5% 32.8% 29.2% 
Yes 49.5% 37.1% 39.8% 
No 28.4% 22.2% 25.4% 
Scenario 3:  
Voluntary Payment, 
Private Provision Overall 40.7% 31.0% 31.9% 
Yes 59.1% 50.3% 46.8% 
No 29.6% 28.3% 26.9% 
Scenario 4:  
Collective Payment, 
Private Provision Overall 52.4% 42.0% 36.6% 
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Table 3. Model Variables  
Variable Description 
Bid $0.5, $3, or $8 depending on survey version 
Payment and Provision Dummy Variables
Voluntary Payment 1 if voluntary payment; 0 if collective payment 
Private Provision 1 if private provision; 0 if government provision 
Demographic and Socioeconomic Variables
Rent 1 if rent; 0 if home ownership 
Age 1-7 age scale 
Female 1 if female; 0 if male 
Children 1 if have children; 0 otherwise 
Liberalism 1-5 scale; 1=very conservative, 5=very liberal 
Education 1-8 education scale 
Income 1-12 household income scale 
Attitudinal Questions: 1-5 agreement scales; 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree
First Mover “I am often one of the first people I know to try new products” 
Little One Can Do “There is not much that any one individual can do about the environment” 
Affected by Others “I am more likely to buy environmentally friendly products if I know that other people 
are doing the same” 
Company Distrust “I don’t trust the environmental claims of companies offering environmentally friendly 
products” 
Distrust of Others “I don’t trust other people to make personal sacrifices to protect the environment” 
No Regulations “Now that companies are offering environmentally friendly products, we don’t need as 
many environmental regulations” 
Government Distrust “The government can’t be trusted to collect funds and spend them on worthwhile causes” 
All Should Pay “The government should require everyone to help pay for environmental improvements” 
Direct Benefits “I will only pay more for environmentally friendly products if I receive a direct benefit 
from doing so” 
Family Support “I think my family and friends would support renewable energy if they had the option” 
Other Questions
Participation 
Expectations 
1-10 scale on perceived likelihood that others would be willing to pay 
Environmental 
Actions 
Number of environmental actions done by household on regular basis from list of 11 
possibilities  
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Table 4. Logit Equations for Pair Wise Comparisons 
Collective vs. Voluntary Payment Government vs. Private Provision 
Variable Government 
Provision 
coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Private  
Provision 
coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Voluntary 
Payment 
coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Collective 
Payment 
coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Bid -0.097*** 
(-0.025) 
-0.147*** 
(0.027) 
-0.091*** 
(0.026) 
-0.149*** 
(0.026) 
Rent -0.204 
(0.223) 
0.261 
(0.249) 
0.086 
(0.230) 
-0.098 
(0.236) 
Age -0.081 
(0.063) 
-0.097 
(0.063) 
-0.097 
(0.061) 
-0.093 
(0.064) 
Female 0.448*** 
(0.177) 
-0.024 
(0.178) 
-0.042 
(0.171) 
0.485*** 
(0.186) 
Children 0.054 
(0.215) 
-0.468** 
(0.221) 
-0.037 
(0.209) 
-0.389* 
(0.224) 
Liberalism 0.316*** 
(0.084) 
0.229*** 
(0.086) 
0.303*** 
(0.083) 
0.233*** 
(0.086) 
Education 0.000 
(0.058) 
0.115** 
(0.058) 
0.059 
(0.057) 
0.062 
(0.060) 
Income 0.117*** 
(0.031) 
0.089*** 
(0.032) 
0.092*** 
(0.031) 
0.108*** 
(0.033) 
Private Provision 
 
na na 0.200 
(0.159) 
0.505*** 
(0.167) 
Voluntary Payment 
 
-0.139 
(0.161) 
-0.451*** 
(0.165) 
Na na 
Constant -0.819 
(0.575) 
0.226 
(0.561) 
-0.874 
(0.553) 
-0.296 
(0.583) 
# of Observations 682 698 694 686 
Log Likelihood -442.5 -429.0 -454.3 -421.2 
LR Test 59.46 85.95 52.10 86.06 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
% Correct Predictions 62.3% 65.6% 59.2% 66.6% 
*, **, ***  denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
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Table 5. Logit Equations for Independent Sample Results  
Treatment 
Variable Scenario 1: 
Coll/Gov’t 
coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Scenario 2: 
Vol/Gov’t 
coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Scenario 3: 
Vol/Pvt 
coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Scenario 4: 
Coll/Pvt 
coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Bid -0.17*** 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.08* 
(0.05) 
-0.23*** 
(0.06) 
Rent -1.01** 
(0.47) 
-0.72* 
(0.39) 
0.31 
(0.43) 
0.33 
(0.49) 
Age -0.08 
(0.13) 
-0.18 
(0.12) 
-0.20* 
(0.12) 
-0.26* 
(0.14) 
Female 0.90** 
(0.38) 
0.15 
(0.33) 
-0.20 
(0.31) 
0.52 
(0.44)) 
Children -0.05 
(0.46) 
0.32 
(0.37) 
-0.43 
(0.38) 
-0.43 
(0.50) 
Liberalism -0.03 
(0.18) 
0.08 
(0.16) 
0.11 
(0.16) 
-0.29 
(0.19) 
Education 0.03 
(0.13) 
-0.06 
(0.11) 
0.26** 
(0.11) 
-0.04 
(0.13) 
Income 0.08 
(0.07) 
0.12** 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
First Mover 0.04 
(0.18) 
0.19 
(0.15) 
0.35** 
(0.15) 
-0.14 
(0.17)) 
Little One Can Do -0.24* 
(0.14) 
-0.04 
(0.12) 
-0.03 
(0.13) 
0.07 
(0.16) 
Affected by Others 0.11 
(0.14) 
0.27* 
(0.14) 
0.09 
(0.14) 
0.31** 
(0.17) 
Company Distrust -0.25 
(0.19) 
-0.01 
(0.17) 
-0.18 
(0.18) 
-0.15 
(0.20) 
Distrust of Others 0.22 
(0.17) 
0.14 
(0.16) 
-0.09 
(0.17)) 
0.02 
(0.17) 
No Regulations -0.05 
(0.16) 
-0.15 
(0.14) 
0.11 
(0.16) 
-0.22 
(0.17) 
Government Distrust -0.43*** 
(0.15) 
-0.27** 
(0.13) 
-0.10 
(0.13) 
-0.34** 
(0.16) 
All Should Pay 0.71*** 
(0.14) 
0.25** 
(0.12) 
0.27** 
(0.12) 
0.41*** 
(0.15) 
Direct Benefits -0.01 
(0.15) 
-0.42*** 
(0.15) 
-0.35*** 
(0.14) 
-0.31* 
(0.16) 
Family Support 0.62*** 
(0.19) 
0.74*** 
(0.19) 
0.59*** 
(0.21) 
0.77*** 
(0.22) 
Participation Expectations 0.48*** 
(0.09) 
0.41*** 
(0.09) 
0.61*** 
(0.10) 
0.56*** 
(0.10)) 
Environ. Actions 0.21** 
(0.11) 
0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.05 
(0.09) 
0.29*** 
(0.11) 
Constant -4.75*** 
(1.77) 
-4.02*** 
(1.49) 
-4.16** 
(1.63) 
-1.50 
1.89 
Number of Observations 318 330 324 336 
Log Likelihood -121.0 -152.3 -152.1 -112.8 
LR Test 196.4 152.6 141.77 212.5 
p-value 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.00 
% Correct Predictions 84.6% 78.5% 77.5% 84.9% 
*, **, ***  denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
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Table 6. Response to Payment Preferences Question 
Payment Preference Overall 
Response 
Response of Those Who 
Indicated Support for 
Renewables  
Response of Those Who 
Indicated a Lack of 
Support for Renewables 
Required Surcharge 53% 70% 29% 
Voluntary Surcharge 47% 30% 71% 
Sample Size n=182 n = 106 n = 75 
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Table 7. Response to Provision Preferences Question 
Payment Preference Overall 
Response 
Response of Those Who 
Indicated Support for 
Renewables 
Response of Those Who 
Indicated a Lack of 
Support for Renewables 
Government Provision 46% 45% 47% 
Private Provision 54% 55% 53% 
Sample Size n= 179 n = 106  n = 72 
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Figure 1. WTP Responses by Scenario and Bid Level 
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